A story in diagrams · October 2026

Thinking Clearly

A Story in 100 Diagrams
by Mat Siems
Part I

The Fog

Why minds go wrong by default.

Chapter 1 · Part I

The Mind Is Not a Camera

You are standing in a car park, quite sure you left the car in row C. You can see it, almost: the grey bonnet, the trolley bay, the puddle. Ten minutes later you find it in row F, next to a puddle you have never seen before. Nothing has gone wrong with your eyes. Something has gone right with your brain, which was doing its usual job of filling in the gaps with whatever seemed plausible.

We talk about seeing as if the mind were a camera: light goes in, a picture comes out, and the picture is the world. It is a comforting idea and a wrong one. Perception is closer to a best guess assembled from scraps. Your eyes deliver a jittery, patchy stream; your brain smooths it, labels it and hands you a finished scene, with the joins painted over. Memory is worse. Elizabeth Loftus spent a career showing that recollection is rebuilt each time it is used, and that a well-placed word in a question can add a broken window to a car crash that had none.

The most famous demonstration is the one with the gorilla. Daniel Simons and Christopher Chabris asked people to count basketball passes in a short film. Partway through, someone in a gorilla suit wanders into the middle, thumps their chest and leaves. A large share of viewers never see it. They were not careless; they were busy. Attention is a narrow torch, and whatever falls outside the beam is not dimly seen. It is simply not there.

Follow the funnel in the figure from top to bottom. The world offers far more than any head can hold. The senses take a sample. Attention takes a sample of the sample. Then expectation fills the holes with what usually goes there, and what emerges at the bottom feels exactly like reality, because it is the only reality you get. The trouble is not that the process is lossy. Every useful system is lossy. The trouble is that it arrives with no label saying so.

You do not see the world. You see your edit of it.

None of this is a reason for despair, or for squinting suspiciously at your own breakfast. Most of the time the guesses are good, which is why we survived long enough to build car parks. But it is a reason for a little modesty at exactly the moments we feel least modest: when we are certain what we saw, sure what was said, confident the car is in row C. Certainty is a feeling the brain produces, not a measurement it takes. The camera, it turns out, was a painter all along, and a fast one, and it never signs its work.

From the world to your edit of it The world far more than any head can hold The senses a narrow, patchy sample Attention a torch, not a floodlight Expectation fills gaps with the usual What you 'see' your edit, unsigned Filtered out blur, blind spot drops Never seen the gorilla, mid-count misses Added in Loftus: a broken window invents Feels like reality no label says 'edited' hides joins Memory: row C check the ticket Ticket: row F the car park, ten minutes later You do not see the world. You see your edit of it.
Fig 1 · The Mind Is Not a Camera. The world pours in; by the time it reaches you, most of it has been dropped, guessed or quietly redrawn.
Chapter 2 · Part I

Two Speeds, One Driver

A bat and a ball cost £1.10 together. The bat costs a pound more than the ball. How much is the ball? If ten pence arrived in your head before you had finished reading, welcome to the club. It is a large club, and its members include many clever people at good universities. The answer is five pence, and you can check it, but checking is the part nobody volunteers for.

Daniel Kahneman, building on decades of work with Amos Tversky, gave the two modes names that stuck: System 1 and System 2. System 1 is fast, automatic and effortless. It reads faces, finishes sentences and brakes when a child steps into the road. System 2 is slow, deliberate and expensive. It does long division, follows an argument, and notices that ten pence cannot be right. Kahneman was careful to say these are characters in a story, not two lumps of tissue, but the story is useful because it describes something we all recognise.

Look at the two columns in the figure. The left one runs your life, and mostly runs it well. You could not cross a room if every step required a committee meeting. The right column is where clear thinking lives, but it is lazy by design, since effort costs something and the brain is a careful accountant. So System 2 tends to do what a tired manager does with a pile of expenses: glance at the total, assume it is fine, and sign.

There used to be a tidy theory that self-control is a fuel tank that runs dry, called ego depletion. It was popular, it was in all the books, and large replication attempts have struggled to find much of it. Treat it as unsettled. The broader point survives without it: slow thinking is something you have to choose to do, and you are least likely to choose it when you are hurried, distracted or very sure.

So there is one driver and two speeds, and the danger is not the fast lane. The danger is believing you were in the slow lane when you were not. The feeling of having reasoned something out is produced just as smoothly by a quick hunch that has been given a tidy explanation afterwards. The ball costs five pence. The bat costs a pound and five. The cost of not checking is usually small and occasionally enormous, and the two feel identical from the inside.

Bat and ball: who actually answers Bat + ball = £1.10 the bat costs £1 more. The ball? System 1 fast, automatic runs most of the day System 2 slow, deliberate called in rarely Hunch: 10p before you finish Feels right cheap, confident Ball = 10p wrong; feels right Glance, sign the tired manager Ball = 5p 5p + £1.05 = £1.10 reads rings passes up signs off (usual) checks Kahneman: two characters in a story, not two lumps of tissue ego depletion (self-control as a fuel tank): unsettled after replications The cost of not checking feels identical from the inside.
Fig 2 · Two Speeds, One Driver. Fast thinking does nearly all the driving; slow thinking mostly signs off on where it has already gone.
Chapter 3 · Part I

The Story Machine

Your colleague does not reply to your email. By lunchtime you have a theory. By teatime you have a motive. By the evening you have a full three-act drama in which you were slighted, the slight was deliberate, and it is probably connected to that thing in the March meeting. The next morning she replies. She was off sick. The drama goes back in the cupboard, and you tell nobody how good it was.

The mind is a story machine. It cannot leave fragments lying about; it joins them into causes, and causes into characters with intentions. Michael Gazzaniga saw this vividly in split-brain patients, whose two hemispheres had been surgically disconnected. When the non-verbal half was shown an instruction and the patient acted on it, the talking half, which had not seen the instruction, would cheerfully invent a reason for the action. Gazzaniga called it the interpreter: a narrator that explains whatever happens, whether or not it knows why.

The rest of us are not split, but we have the same narrator. Kahneman summed up its habit as what you see is all there is. The machine builds the most coherent story it can from the pieces to hand and does not ask what pieces are missing. Less information often produces more confidence, because there are fewer awkward facts to fit. A tidy tale feels true precisely because it is tidy, and tidiness is cheap.

Follow the steps in the diagram. Scraps come in. A pattern is spotted. A cause is supplied, then a character with a motive. Last of all comes the feeling of certainty, which is the step that matters, because it shuts the workshop. Once the story feels finished, the search for other explanations quietly stops. Nobody goes looking for the sick note when they already have the villain.

This is not a defect to be removed. Stories are how we remember, teach and plan; a mind without one would be a filing cabinet with anxiety. The trick is to notice the machine running, and to ask the dull, useful question it hates: what else would produce the same scraps? Usually there are several answers. Usually the boring one is right. The colleague was ill, the bus was late, the share price moved because share prices move. The world is full of plots, most of them written by us.

How three dots become a villain THE STORY MACHINE A TUESDAY EMAIL 1 Scraps arrive fragments, unlinked No reply to your email 09:12, Tuesday links 2 A pattern dots joined into a line Like that March meeting two dots, one line blames 3 A cause nearest culprit cast She's ignoring me the nearest plausible culprit personifies 4 A character the cause gets a motive ...and it's deliberate a three-act drama by teatime seals it 5 Certainty the workshop shuts Case closed nobody looks for the sick note loop back and ask: what else would produce the same scraps? Gazzaniga's 'interpreter' narrates, whether or not it knows why The world is full of plots, most of them written by us.
Fig 3 · The Story Machine. Give the brain three dots and it draws a line, a motive and a villain, then forgets it did the drawing.
Chapter 4 · Part I

Feelings Arrive First

You walk into a house you are thinking of buying. Before the estate agent has finished saying "deceptively spacious", you know. Something about the hallway, the light, the smell of someone else's toast. You then spend forty minutes asking sensible questions about the boiler, and every answer, oddly, confirms what you knew in the first three seconds.

Feelings get there first. Robert Zajonc argued decades ago that liking and disliking can arise before we have consciously worked out what we are looking at; his phrase was that preferences need no inferences. Paul Slovic and colleagues later described the affect heuristic: when something feels good, we tend to judge its benefits high and its risks low, and the reverse when it feels bad, as if the two were linked when in the real world they often are not.

Jonathan Haidt offers a picture that sticks: an elephant and a rider. The elephant is intuition and emotion, large and strong-willed. The rider is conscious reasoning, who likes to think he is steering but spends much of his time explaining where the elephant has already decided to go. Haidt's point is not that the rider is useless. It is that he is more often a press secretary than a pilot.

The timeline in the figure runs in the order that matters. First a flicker of feeling, then a verdict, then reasons, assembled to fit the verdict. Last comes the defence, where we argue for our reasons as if they had come first. The sequence is short. Much of it happens before the toast smell has even registered as toast. By the time we are aware of thinking, the thinking has usually been done for us.

This is not a case against feelings. Feelings carry information: years of pattern-matching compressed into a single shiver. A nurse who feels uneasy about a patient, or an engineer who dislikes a noise, is often right before they can say why, as Gary Klein's work on expert intuition shows. The trouble is that feelings carry information without a label of quality. Expert unease and stale prejudice feel exactly alike.

So the useful move is not to ignore the elephant. It is to notice which way it is leaning before the rider starts drafting statements. Ask what you felt in the first three seconds, and then ask whether the forty minutes that followed were inquiry or advocacy. Buy the house if you like. Just check the boiler as if you had not.

Three seconds, then forty minutes light, toast smell Feeling a flicker: like it 0 s agent still talking Verdict 'this is the one' ~3 s 40 minutes of questions Reasons chosen to fit +40 min the press secretary speaks Defence argued as if first afterwards decides recruits argues not to scale Elephant: intuition (Haidt) decides, large and strong-willed Rider: reasoning explains where it already went hands over Zajonc: preferences need no inferences · Slovic: the affect heuristic Klein: expert unease is real signal, but it carries no quality label The verdict lands in a blink; the reasons turn up later, dressed for court.
Fig 4 · Feelings Arrive First. The verdict lands in a blink; the reasons turn up later, dressed for court.
Chapter 5 · Part I

The Comfort of Certainty

The weather app says there is a sixty per cent chance of rain. You take an umbrella. It does not rain. You decide the app is useless and delete it, which is a little like firing a bookmaker because the favourite lost. Sixty per cent was never a promise. It was an honest description of a world that does not hand out promises.

We hate that sort of honesty. The mind has what Arie Kruglanski called a need for closure: a wish for a firm answer, almost any firm answer, rather than an open question. It is stronger when we are tired, rushed or anxious, which is to say most of the time. A clear wrong answer often feels better than an accurate maybe. Uncertainty is a draught under the door, and we stuff anything into the gap.

Look along the spectrum in the figure. At one end sits the fog of permanent doubt: the person who will not decide because nothing is certain, which is its own kind of certainty. At the other end sits the fortress, where every question is closed and every new fact is an attack. Both are comfortable. Both are wrong in the same way, because neither lets evidence move the needle. The place worth standing is in between, where beliefs come with rough odds attached and the odds are allowed to change.

Philip Tetlock's long study of forecasting found that well-known pundits, the confident ones with crisp opinions, often did little better than chance on long-range political questions. The people who did best, his later superforecasters, were notably comfortable with numbers like sixty-three per cent and with revising them on Wednesday in light of Tuesday. They were not cleverer, on the whole, than the pundits. They were less in need of comfort.

Certainty has its uses. You cannot cross a road on a probability distribution, and nobody wants a surgeon who announces mid-operation that she is now only seventy per cent sure. But certainty is best treated as a conclusion you are allowed to reach, not a mood you are entitled to start from. The confident voice in a meeting is often the least calibrated one in the room, and the most persuasive.

So keep the umbrella, and keep the app. Sixty per cent means that on days like this it rains about six times in ten. Today was one of the four. That is not a failure of the forecast. It is the forecast working, in a world that was never going to tell you in advance.

Where a belief can stand Fog permanent doubt nothing decided 'nothing is certain' Calibrated rough odds, revised sixty per cent, for now evidence: 60% → 63% Fortress every question closed new fact = attack facts bounce off need for closure skips the middle tired · rushed · anxious (Kruglanski) HOW SURE YOU FEEL 0% 50% 100% superforecasters: 63% pundits: ≈ chance 60% rain: of ten days like this, six are wet (Tetlock: keep score) today: one of the four. The forecast worked. Certainty is a conclusion you may reach, not a mood to start from.
Fig 5 · The Comfort of Certainty. Doubt is uncomfortable and certainty is cosy; the useful place to stand is the draughty middle.
Chapter 6 · Part I

Noise Pretending to Be Signal

Sales were up eleven per cent in March. The team got a pizza lunch and a speech. In April they were down nine per cent, and the team got a different speech, delivered at a different volume, without pizza. Nothing about the team had changed. Nothing about the product had changed. What changed was the dice, and nobody had been told there were dice.

Most numbers wobble. Shop takings, exam marks, a striker's goals, your blood pressure at the GP: each is a bit of underlying truth plus a bit of chance. The chance part is noise, and the mind is spectacularly bad at recognising it. We see a run of good months and look for the genius. We see a bad one and look for the culprit. Very often there is neither.

Kahneman tells the story of flight instructors who were sure that praising a good landing made the next one worse, while shouting at a bad landing made the next one better. What they were seeing was regression to the mean: an unusually good landing is usually followed by a more ordinary one, whatever you say, and an unusually bad one likewise. The shouting got the credit that belonged to arithmetic. Generations of managers have learned the same wrong lesson in the same way.

There is a nice wrinkle here. For years the "hot hand" in basketball was the textbook example of seeing streaks in randomness. Then, in 2018, Joshua Miller and Adam Sanjurjo found a subtle statistical error in the classic analysis, and the evidence now suggests a small hot hand may be real after all. The lesson stands, with a footnote: our instinct to see patterns is unreliable, and so, occasionally, is our confidence that there is none.

The matrix in the figure sorts what you see by two questions: how big does the change look, and does it keep happening? A big one-off jump is the classic impostor, loud and usually meaningless. A small one-off is just weather. A big change that repeats is real and obvious. The cell worth highlighting is the quiet one: a small change, steadily repeated, which looks like nothing each month and turns out to be everything over a year.

So before you order the pizza or the speech, ask how much this number normally wobbles. If nobody knows, that is the first finding. Plot a few months, not one. Wait for the second data point before building the cathedral on the first. The universe is not sending you messages. It is mostly just rolling.

Sorting a wobble from a change DOES IT KEEP HAPPENING? repeats once looks small looks big HOW BIG DOES IT LOOK? Quiet trend small, but steady nothing monthly, everything yearly Obvious signal big and repeated real; everyone has noticed Weather small, once ignore it Loud one-off big, once: usually noise flight instructors misread it compounds mean Mar +11% Apr −9% regresses footnote: the basketball 'hot hand' may be small but real (Miller & Sanjurjo, 2018) Wait for the second data point before building the cathedral.
Fig 6 · Noise Pretending to Be Signal. Most dramatic swings are one-off noise; the quiet change that keeps repeating is the one to watch.
Chapter 7 · Part I

The Tribe Votes Before You Do

At a family dinner someone mentions a contested topic. You can feel the table divide before anyone has said what they think, the way a room goes quiet when the wrong song comes on. You already know where your uncle stands, and he knows where you stand, and neither of you has looked at a single fact since the soup.

Humans are group animals. For most of our history, being cast out of the group was far more dangerous than being wrong about the weather, so the mind learned to keep track of what the group believes and to want to agree with it. Solomon Asch's famous line experiments in the 1950s showed people going along with an obviously wrong majority a surprising fraction of the time, even with strangers and even about the length of a line. With people we care about, and topics we care about, the pull is stronger.

Dan Kahan and colleagues have a name for one version of this: identity-protective cognition. When a factual question becomes a badge of membership, people tend to process evidence in a way that protects their standing in the group. On some politically charged questions, Kahan found that people with greater numeracy were not more likely to converge on the evidence; they were often better at reading it in their side's favour.

Go round the ring in the figure. Identity shapes what a person is inclined to believe. Belief, said aloud, signals loyalty. Loyalty earns approval, and approval strengthens identity, so the loop tightens. Each lap feels like thinking. None of it requires checking. The highlighted node is the one that does the damage, because once a belief is mainly a signal, changing it costs friends, not just pride.

This is not a story about other people's tribes, though it is much easier to see from outside. Everyone has a side, including people whose side is "I'm not on a side". A useful test is to ask what your group would think of you if you changed your mind on this question. If the honest answer is "they would think less of me", then the question is no longer purely factual for you, and your reasoning on it deserves a lighter touch and a second look.

None of this means agreeing with the uncle. It means noticing that the vote was taken before the soup arrived, and that you were a voter. Belonging is a fine thing to want. It is a poor thing to confuse with evidence.

The loop that votes before you do Identity who we are Belief taken before evidence Loyalty signal costs friends to change Approval nods, likes, belonging Tribe the dinner table shapes said aloud earns tightens evidence Asch, 1950s: people followed a wrong majority on the length of a line Kahan: identity-protective cognition; more numeracy, better at reading for one's side test: what would my group think if I changed my mind on this? Belonging is a fine thing to want and a poor thing to confuse with evidence.
Fig 7 · The Tribe Votes Before You Do. Belief buys belonging, belonging rewards belief, and round it goes until evidence cannot get a word in.
Chapter 8 · Part I

Busy Is Not Thinking

By eleven o'clock you have answered thirty-one emails, attended two meetings, updated a tracker and moved a meeting about the tracker. You feel productive in the way a hamster feels athletic. At no point have you asked whether the project the tracker tracks should exist.

Busyness is the great disguise. It looks like work, it feels like work and, crucially, it keeps you from the one kind of work that is unpleasant: sitting still with a hard question. Blaise Pascal remarked that many of humanity's troubles come from our inability to sit quietly in a room alone. In 2014 Timothy Wilson and colleagues tested a version of this. Left alone with their thoughts for a few minutes, a striking number of participants chose to give themselves a mild electric shock rather than do nothing. Thinking, it seems, is a thing we will pay to avoid.

The modern office is very good at helping. Every channel offers a small, urgent, answerable thing. Each reply produces a little click of completion, and a day of clicks feels like a day well spent. Meanwhile the questions without clicks, such as what are we actually trying to do and is this the way to do it, wait politely at the bottom of the list, where they have waited since spring.

Look at the layers in the figure. At the surface are replies and notifications, the most visible and least consequential part of the day. Below them, meetings and tasks: real work, usually someone else's priorities. Further down are the decisions that set those priorities. At the bottom is the question nobody has asked, the one that would make half the work above unnecessary. It is highlighted because it is the cheapest thing in the diagram to change and the most expensive thing to ignore.

None of this is a sermon against email. Some replies matter, and a person who answers nothing is not a philosopher, merely unreachable. The point is proportion. Clear thinking needs undisturbed time, and undisturbed time no longer happens by accident. It has to be booked, defended and spent on the bottom layer, not the top.

Try a crude audit. At the end of a busy day, write down one thing you decided rather than merely did. If the line is blank, that is not a scandal. It is information. A ship can have a very busy crew and still be sailing confidently towards the wrong port, and the deck will be spotless when it arrives.

The day, by depth Replies emails, pings: a small click each 31 emails by 11:00 Meetings, tasks real work, someone else's list 2 meetings, 1 tracker Decisions made rarely, often by default set the list above The question unasked since spring should this exist at all? loud, trivial quiet, decisive shapes all above Wilson et al., 2014 a mild shock beat sitting alone Tonight's audit write one thing you decided, not did The bottom layer is the cheapest to change and the costliest to ignore.
Fig 8 · Busy Is Not Thinking. The visible day is replies and meetings; the decision that matters sits at the bottom, untouched.
Chapter 9 · Part I

Clever People, Silly Beliefs

Linus Pauling won two Nobel Prizes, one of them for chemistry, and spent his later years insisting that huge doses of vitamin C would ward off colds and help against cancer, claims that careful trials did not bear out. Arthur Conan Doyle, who invented the most famous rational detective in fiction, was persuaded that two girls in Yorkshire had photographed real fairies. These were not stupid men. That is the point.

We tend to assume that intelligence is a vaccine against nonsense. It is closer to a power tool. Pointed at an open question, it digs quickly towards the truth. Pointed at a conclusion already chosen, it digs just as quickly, and builds an impressive tunnel to the wrong place. Keith Stanovich coined the word dysrationalia for this gap: being highly intelligent and still reasoning badly, because the skill of reasoning and the habit of using it fairly are different things.

The tree in the figure asks the obvious question and splits it two ways. Down one branch, the clever person is motivated: they want the answer, and their cleverness becomes an advocate. Here we find motivated reasoning, where the standard of proof quietly rises for unwelcome evidence and falls for welcome evidence, and its cousin, the better arguer, who wins every debate including the ones with reality. Down the other branch, the clever person is out of their field. Brilliance in one domain lends a confidence that does not travel. A Nobel in chemistry is not a licence in oncology.

Richard Feynman put the remedy plainly in a 1974 lecture: the first principle is that you must not fool yourself, and you are the easiest person to fool. He meant it as a working rule, not a compliment. The cleverer you are, the better the stories you can tell yourself, and the harder they are for anyone else to puncture.

The useful habit is not to distrust intelligence, your own included, but to watch where it is pointing. Ask whether you would accept this quality of evidence if it went the other way. Ask what an expert in that field, rather than yours, would say. Notice when you are enjoying an argument a little too much.

None of this makes clever people silly. It makes them human, with sharper tools. Doyle went on believing in his fairies for the rest of his life; one of the girls admitted decades later that most of the photographs were faked with paper cut-outs. The detective would have spotted the pins.

Why clever people believe silly things Why do clever people err? dysrationalia (Stanovich) wants it strays Motivated they want the answer Out of field expertise that doesn't travel argues debates borrows unchecked Advocacy proof bar moves Better arguer beats reality too Halo Nobel ≠ oncology Blind spot uncorrected e.g. e.g. Arthur Conan Doyle believed the Cottingley fairies Linus Pauling two Nobels; vitamin C claims failed THE REMEDY Feynman, 1974: you must not fool yourself and you are the easiest person to fool Pointed at a chosen conclusion, intelligence just gets there faster.
Fig 9 · Clever People, Silly Beliefs. Intelligence is a powerful engine; pointed at a conclusion already chosen, it simply gets there faster.
Chapter 10 · Part I

The Fog Can Be Lifted

You are back in the car park. You still think the car is in row C. The difference, after nine chapters of fog, is that you now hold the thought a little more loosely. You check the ticket. Row F. You walk there without drama, and on the way you notice, with some private amusement, that your brain has already started rewriting the story so that you knew all along.

Everything in this part has been about defaults. The mind guesses and calls it seeing. It answers fast and calls it thinking. It tells stories, leads with feeling, craves certainty, finds patterns in dice, votes with the tribe, mistakes motion for progress and lends its cleverness to whatever it already believes. None of these are failures of character. They are the factory settings of a brain built for speed, safety and belonging, not for accuracy about car parks or quarterly figures.

The good news is that factory settings can be changed, a little, with practice. Tetlock's work found that ordinary people trained in a few simple habits, such as starting from base rates, putting numbers on beliefs and keeping score, made measurably better forecasts. Julia Galef calls the underlying attitude the scout mindset: the wish to see what is really there, as opposed to the soldier's wish to defend a position. Neither requires genius. Both require repetition.

The web in the figure is a map of the rest of this book. At the centre is the clear mind, which is not a place you arrive at but a set of habits you keep. Around it are the practices: clearing the ground before you build, catching your own biases in the mirror, carrying a few good models, thinking in odds, arguing well, deciding with some craft, guarding attention, and writing things down to find out what you think. Each part takes one strand. The figure shows them as a web because each strengthens the others.

None of this will make you fog-proof. Nobody is. Kahneman himself said that decades of studying biases had not made him much better at avoiding them in the moment; what helped more was building procedures and asking other people. That is a modest promise, and a good one. You will not stop guessing. You will get better at checking the ticket.

Clear thinking is a practice, not a talent.

The fog will roll back in tomorrow. It always does, around the same time as the emails. That is not a defeat. It is simply the weather, and you can learn to dress for it.

Eight practices around one habit First principles clear the ground PART II The mirror catch your biases PART III Toolkit a few good models PART IV Odds think in bets PART V Argument disagree well PART VI Decisions choose, then act PART VII Calm guard the hours PART VIII The page write to think PART IX Clear mind habits, not genius Part I: the fog factory settings practise daily Tetlock: base rates, numbers, score Part X: clear mind scout, not soldier Clear thinking is a practice, not a talent.
Fig 10 · The Fog Can Be Lifted. The fog is the default, not the destiny; a handful of practices, done daily, keep it thin.
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Thinking Clearly · First Edition, October 2026
100 chapters · 10 parts · one hundred diagrams
by Mat Siems · MS Books, No. 15 · 2026